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RECENT DECISIONS
the work to be done were its officers or agents, and assumed to act as
such in doing it, the municipality would not be liable if the acts were
"ultra vires." Stoddard v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 127 N. Y. 266,
27 N. E. 1030 (1891); Smith v. City of Rochester, supra. If it ap-
pears that the wrongdoer held an office or employment under the
municipality, if he was engaged in his personal business when he
caused the injury complained of, the municipality was not liable.
(19 R. C. L. 1339).
The decision of the Appellate Division is in accord with the fore-
going authorities. A municipality having no authority to divert its
property held for public purposes to the use of a private individual,
the act of the foreman in permitting the driver in the Downing case,
supra, to use the car for his own purposes was "ultra vires" whether
or not the foreman had the power to bind the city as an agent under
ordinary circumstances.
FEDERAL COURTS-CoMITY.-In an action in Trespass to try title
to an undivided one-third interest in a certain tract of land if Jeffer-
son County, Texas, Plaintiffs in error claim title first through a con-
veyance from Mary Green executed in 1850; second through a judg-
ment obtained in the District Court of Hardin. County, Texas, and
third by operation of the Statute of Limitations. Defendants claim
title through the heirs at law of Mary Green and also rely on
possession under Statute of Limitations. Held, for the defendants.
Where Federal court first construes a state statute, as to construc-
tion of which State Courts' decisions were conflicting, it is not there-
after obliged to follow contrary decision of highest State Court;
but where later decisions of State Court have become a rule of
property, in order to avoid conflict between State and Federal Juris-
diction, Federal Court should recede from former decision. Judg-
ment affirmed. Andrus v. Hutchinson, 17 Fed. (2) 472, (C. C. A.
5th, 1927).
The question of the construction of a Texas Statute, Laws 1907
C. 865, sec. 1, Amending Rev. St. 1895, Art. 2312, was involved and
the United States Circuit Court held that by virtue of this act defect
in Deed was cured and the deed was valid and admissible in evi-
dence, Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, (C. C. A. 5th, 1909). Subs6-
quently the Supreme Court of Texas. Holland v. Votaw, 103 Tex.
534, 131 S. W. 406 (1910), decided, in refusing a writ of error to
Court of Civil Appeals, that the act of 1907 (supra) does not under-
take to validate conveyances by married women that before were
invalid, even where the invalidity consists only of want of proper
acknowledgment. After decision by State Court the case of Downs
v. Blount, Blount v. Downs, 194 F. Ed. 1020 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912) came
back to Circuit Court and opinion originally handed down was ad-
hered to. A writ of certiorari was denied by U. S. Supreme Court
226 U. S. 609, (1912). When the principal case was brought on
appeal. Court stated * * * Where a Federal Court has first con-
strued a State Statute, it is not obliged thereafter to follow a decision
of the Supreme Court of the State to the contrary, although * * *
We prefer now to recede from the decision in Downs v. .Blount, and
to follow the Texas decisions, and to hold that the deed in this case
was absolutely void and conveyed no title. In another case, John
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Deere Plow Co. v. Mowry, 222 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915), it was.
held that "it is only to a settled rule of a State Court applicable to the
precise facts disclosed by the record that Federal Court should yield
its own judgment."
The weight of the authority seems to be that where there has
not been a final adjudication by the highest court of State the Federal
Courts will make their own rule and are bound thereby. Dernberger
v. B. & 0. R. R., 243 Fed. 21, (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); U. S.
v. Cargel, 263 Fed. 856, (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; John Deere Plow Co. v.
Mowry supra, Karch Co. v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950, (C. C. A. 6th,
1916).
Better Rule would seem to be that in construing a State Statute
the Federal Courts should for sake of harmony lean to agreement
with State Court. Pineland Club v. Roberts, 213 Fed. 545, (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); Holden v. Circleville Light & Power Co., 216 Fed. 490,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE--INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE-The de-
fendant was charged, in the indictment and on the trial was convicted,
of killing one Mahaira while engaged in the commission of a felony,
to wit, the crime of robbery, upon the person killed. Evidence as
to the defendant's intoxication was adduced as a defense and the
court charged that the defendant could he convicted of first degree
murder or acquitted. An appeal is brought on a refusal to charge as
to the different degrees of homicide. Held, that since a conviction of
homicide was dependent upon specific intent, it was error to refuse
the charge as to intoxication. Judgment reversed and new trial
granted, three judges dissenting, the dissenting opinion is apparently
based on the conclusiori that no intoxication was shown by the evi-
dence and that therefore the conviction should be affirmed. People
v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 97 (1926).
Voluntary intoxication has not always been considered a defense
in a criminal prosecution "He who is guilty of any crime whatever,
through his voluntary drunkenness, shall be punished for it as much as
if he had been sober." 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 1 par. 6. In fact, some old
decisions, no longer law, hold that voluntary drunkenness is an aggrava-
tion of the crime; Beverly's Case, 4 Coke 123 B. 125 A; 4 Black. Com-
?5; State v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617 (1834). This rule was
apparently based on the theory that voluntary intoxication is, in
itself, a wrongful act, for the immediate consequences of which the
law will hold the party liable. Lew U. S. Crim. Law 405; O'Herrin v.
State, 14 Ind. 420 (1860). But settled insanity produced by habitual
intoxication is a defense to crime to the same extent as insanity pro-
duced by other causes. State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657
(1888); State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Pen. (Del.) 131, 53 Atl. 335 (1902).
The modem rule of intoxication, in New York, has been embodied
in the Penal Code, sec. 1220, which provides substantially that no
criminal act shall be excused by reason of voluntary intoxication.
But, wherever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive,
or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or
degree of crime, the jury may take in to consideration the fact that
the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose,
motive or intent with which he .committed the act. This statute has
